CVE-2026-0757

8.8 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on systems running vulnerable versions of MCP Manager for Claude Desktop. Attackers can bypass the sandbox protection by tricking users into visiting malicious pages or opening malicious files. This affects all users of MCP Manager for Claude Desktop with vulnerable configurations.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • MCP Manager for Claude Desktop
Versions: All versions prior to patched release
Operating Systems: Windows, macOS, Linux
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Vulnerability exists in default configurations when processing MCP config objects. User interaction required (visiting malicious page or opening malicious file).

⚠️ Manual Verification Required

This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.

Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).

🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.

Recommended Actions:
  1. Review the CVE details at NVD
  2. Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
  3. Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
  4. Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete system compromise with attacker gaining medium integrity code execution, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or lateral movement within the network.

🟠

Likely Case

Local privilege escalation leading to unauthorized access to system resources, file system manipulation, and installation of persistent malware.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact due to proper network segmentation, application sandboxing, and user privilege restrictions preventing full system compromise.

🌐 Internet-Facing: MEDIUM
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ✅ No
Complexity: MEDIUM

Requires user interaction but has been assigned ZDI-CAN-27810 identifier suggesting active research. Command injection vulnerabilities are frequently weaponized.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Check vendor advisory for specific version

Vendor Advisory: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-023/

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Visit the vendor advisory URL
2. Download the latest patched version of MCP Manager for Claude Desktop
3. Uninstall the vulnerable version
4. Install the patched version
5. Restart the application and system

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Disable MCP Manager execution

all

Temporarily disable MCP Manager functionality until patch can be applied

# Linux/macOS: chmod -x /path/to/mcp-manager
# Windows: Rename executable or use Group Policy to disable

Network isolation

all

Restrict network access to prevent malicious content delivery

# Use firewall rules to block unnecessary network traffic
# Implement web filtering to block malicious sites

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution
  • Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with command injection detection capabilities

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check MCP Manager version against vendor advisory. If using version prior to patched release, system is vulnerable.

Check Version:

# Linux/macOS: mcp-manager --version
# Windows: Check About dialog or executable properties

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify installed version matches or exceeds patched version specified in vendor advisory. Test MCP config processing with safe test payloads.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unusual command execution patterns from MCP Manager process
  • Suspicious child process creation by MCP Manager
  • Failed sandbox escape attempts in application logs

Network Indicators:

  • Outbound connections from MCP Manager to unknown external IPs
  • DNS requests for suspicious domains following MCP config processing

SIEM Query:

process_name:"mcp-manager" AND (cmdline:*cmd* OR cmdline:*powershell* OR cmdline:*bash*)

🔗 References

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