CVE-2025-0569

7.5 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to cause denial-of-service on Sante PACS Server by sending specially crafted DCM files. The memory corruption occurs during DCM file parsing without requiring authentication. Healthcare organizations using Sante PACS Server for medical imaging are affected.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Sante PACS Server
Versions: Specific versions not detailed in advisory, check vendor documentation
Operating Systems: Windows-based deployments (typical for PACS servers)
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: All deployments with DCM file processing enabled are vulnerable. PACS servers typically process DICOM files from medical imaging devices.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete system crash requiring manual restart, potentially disrupting medical imaging workflows and patient care

🟠

Likely Case

Service disruption affecting DCM file processing capabilities, requiring system restart

🟢

If Mitigated

Minimal impact with proper network segmentation and file upload restrictions

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - No authentication required and remote exploitation possible
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Still exploitable from internal networks but requires network access

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: UNKNOWN
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: MEDIUM

Requires crafting malicious DCM files but no authentication needed. ZDI-CAN-25303 suggests proof-of-concept exists in controlled disclosure.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Check Sante vendor advisory for specific patched version

Vendor Advisory: https://www.santesoft.com/security-advisories/ (check for CVE-2025-0569)

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Contact Sante support for patch availability
2. Backup server configuration and data
3. Apply vendor-provided patch during maintenance window
4. Restart Sante PACS Server services
5. Verify DCM file processing functionality

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Restrict DCM File Sources

windows

Configure firewall rules to only allow DCM file uploads from trusted medical imaging sources

# Example Windows Firewall rule to restrict inbound DICOM traffic
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Restrict DICOM Sources" -Direction Inbound -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 104 -RemoteAddress TrustedImagingDevices -Action Allow

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement network segmentation to isolate PACS server from untrusted networks
  • Deploy web application firewall with DCM file inspection capabilities

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check Sante PACS Server version against vendor advisory. Test with controlled DCM file upload if possible in lab environment.

Check Version:

Check Sante PACS Server administration interface or consult vendor documentation for version command

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify patch installation via version check and test DCM file processing with sample medical images

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple failed DCM file processing attempts
  • Service crash logs mentioning DCM parsing
  • Unusual DCM file upload patterns

Network Indicators:

  • DICOM protocol traffic (port 104 typically) from unexpected sources
  • Large or malformed DCM file transfers

SIEM Query:

source="pacs_server" AND (event_type="service_crash" OR error_message="DCM" OR error_message="memory")

🔗 References

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