CVE-2024-6087

6.5 MEDIUM

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit the user invitation system in lunary-ai/lunary to obtain valid JWT tokens and perform account takeover. Attackers can invite target users, obtain one-time tokens, retract invites, then use those tokens to reset passwords and gain full control of accounts. All users of lunary-ai/lunary with the vulnerable code are affected.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • lunary-ai/lunary
Versions: All versions up to commit a761d83 on main branch
Operating Systems: All
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects the latest main branch commit at time of discovery. The vulnerability is in the authentication flow logic.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete account takeover of any user, allowing attackers to access sensitive AI data, modify configurations, and potentially compromise entire organizations.

🟠

Likely Case

Targeted account compromise of specific users, leading to unauthorized access to AI projects, models, and organizational data.

🟢

If Mitigated

Failed authentication attempts logged, with no successful account compromise due to proper token validation and access controls.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ✅ No
Complexity: LOW

Exploit requires ability to invite users (typically authenticated access), but the attack chain is straightforward once initial access is obtained.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Commit 844e8855c7a713dc7371766dba4125de4007b1cf

Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/844e8855c7a713dc7371766dba4125de4007b1cf

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Update to commit 844e8855c7a713dc7371766dba4125de4007b1cf or later. 2. Restart the lunary application. 3. Verify the fix by testing the invite/registration flow.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Disable user invitations

all

Temporarily disable the 'invite user' functionality to prevent exploitation

Modify application configuration to disable user invitation features

Implement additional token validation

all

Add server-side validation to ensure invite tokens cannot be reused after invite retraction

Implement token revocation logic in authentication middleware

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement rate limiting on password reset endpoints
  • Enable multi-factor authentication for all user accounts

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check if your lunary instance is using code prior to commit 844e8855c7a713dc7371766dba4125de4007b1cf

Check Version:

git log --oneline -1

Verify Fix Applied:

Test the invite flow: 1. Invite a test user 2. Retract the invite 3. Attempt to use the token for password reset - should fail

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple invite/retract cycles for same email
  • Password reset attempts using expired invite tokens
  • Unusual account registration patterns

Network Indicators:

  • Rapid sequence of POST requests to /api/invite and /api/invite/retract endpoints
  • Password reset requests following invite retractions

SIEM Query:

source="lunary-logs" AND (event="invite_retracted" AND event="password_reset" WITHIN 5m)

🔗 References

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