CVE-2021-30234

9.8 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on China Mobile An Lianbao WF-1 routers via command injection in the MLD_PROXY_WAN_CONNECT parameter. Attackers can gain full control of affected routers without authentication. Users of China Mobile An Lianbao WF-1 routers version 1.0.1 are affected.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • China Mobile An Lianbao WF-1 router
Versions: 1.0.1
Operating Systems: Embedded router firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: The vulnerable interface appears to be enabled by default with no authentication required for exploitation.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete router compromise allowing attackers to intercept all network traffic, install persistent malware, pivot to internal networks, and use the router as part of a botnet.

🟠

Likely Case

Router takeover leading to DNS hijacking, credential theft from network traffic, and use as a proxy for malicious activities.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if routers are behind firewalls with strict inbound filtering and network segmentation.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - The vulnerable interface is accessible remotely without authentication, making internet-exposed routers immediate targets.
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Internal attackers or malware could exploit this to pivot through networks, though less accessible than internet-facing deployments.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Public proof-of-concept demonstrates simple HTTP POST requests with shell metacharacters. No authentication required makes exploitation trivial.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: http://iot.10086.cn/?l=en-us

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

Check vendor website for firmware updates. If no patch is available, implement workarounds immediately.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Block access to vulnerable interface

linux

Use firewall rules to block access to the /api/ZRIGMP/set_MLD_PROXY endpoint

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m string --string "/api/ZRIGMP/set_MLD_PROXY" --algo bm -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --string "/api/ZRIGMP/set_MLD_PROXY" --algo bm -j DROP

Disable MLD proxy feature

all

If MLD proxy functionality is not required, disable it through router administration interface

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Place routers behind firewalls with strict inbound filtering and disable WAN administration
  • Implement network segmentation to isolate routers from critical internal resources

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Send a test request to http://[router-ip]/api/ZRIGMP/set_MLD_PROXY with MLD_PROXY_WAN_CONNECT parameter containing shell metacharacters and observe response

Check Version:

Check router web interface or use nmap/curl to identify firmware version

Verify Fix Applied:

Test the same exploit attempt after implementing workarounds to confirm it's blocked

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • HTTP POST requests to /api/ZRIGMP/set_MLD_PROXY containing shell metacharacters like ;, |, &, $, or backticks
  • Unusual process execution from web server context

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP requests to router administration interface from unexpected sources
  • Outbound connections from router to suspicious IPs

SIEM Query:

source="router-logs" AND uri="/api/ZRIGMP/set_MLD_PROXY" AND (request_body="*;*" OR request_body="*|*" OR request_body="*&*" OR request_body="*`*")

🔗 References

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