CVE-2026-27700

8.2 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in Hono framework versions 4.12.0-4.12.1 allows attackers to bypass IP-based access controls when using the AWS Lambda adapter behind an Application Load Balancer. By manipulating the X-Forwarded-For header, attackers can spoof their IP address to appear as trusted. This affects any Hono application deployed on AWS Lambda with ALB that uses IP restriction middleware.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Hono
Versions: 4.12.0 through 4.12.1
Operating Systems: Any
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Only affects deployments using hono/aws-lambda adapter behind AWS Application Load Balancer with IP-based access controls.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete bypass of IP-based authentication and authorization controls, allowing unauthorized access to protected endpoints and potential data exposure.

🟠

Likely Case

Attackers bypass IP whitelisting/blacklisting to access restricted API endpoints or administrative interfaces.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if additional authentication layers exist beyond IP-based controls.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires ability to send HTTP requests with manipulated X-Forwarded-For headers.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: 4.12.2

Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-xh87-mx6m-69f3

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Update Hono package to version 4.12.2 or later using npm/yarn/pnpm. 2. Deploy updated application. 3. Restart Lambda functions.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Custom IP extraction middleware

all

Implement custom middleware to correctly extract client IP from X-Forwarded-For header when using AWS ALB

// Example: Extract last IP from X-Forwarded-For header
app.use('*', async (c, next) => {
  const xff = c.req.header('X-Forwarded-For');
  if (xff) {
    const ips = xff.split(',').map(ip => ip.trim());
    c.set('client-ip', ips[ips.length - 1]);
  }
  await next();
})

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement additional authentication layers beyond IP-based controls
  • Use AWS WAF to validate X-Forwarded-For headers at the ALB level

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check if using Hono 4.12.0 or 4.12.1 with AWS Lambda adapter behind ALB and IP-based access controls.

Check Version:

npm list hono | grep hono

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify Hono version is 4.12.2 or later and test IP restriction functionality with manipulated X-Forwarded-For headers.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Requests with multiple IPs in X-Forwarded-For header
  • Access from unexpected IP addresses to restricted endpoints

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP requests with manipulated X-Forwarded-For headers

SIEM Query:

http.headers.x_forwarded_for:* AND (http.status:403 OR http.status:200) AND NOT http.headers.x_forwarded_for:/(^[^,]+$)/

🔗 References

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