CVE-2026-26308

7.5 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in Envoy's RBAC filter allows attackers to bypass access control policies by sending duplicate HTTP headers with malicious values. When multiple headers with the same name are received, Envoy concatenates them into a single string, allowing attackers to hide malicious content from exact-match validation. This affects all Envoy deployments using RBAC filters for access control.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Envoy Proxy
Versions: All versions prior to 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, and 1.34.13
Operating Systems: All platforms running Envoy
Default Config Vulnerable: ✅ No
Notes: Only affects deployments using RBAC filters with header-based matching rules. Default configurations without RBAC are not vulnerable.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete bypass of all RBAC-based access controls, allowing unauthorized access to protected resources, data exfiltration, or privilege escalation.

🟠

Likely Case

Partial bypass of specific RBAC deny rules, potentially allowing access to restricted endpoints or services that should be blocked.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if additional security layers (WAF, authentication, network segmentation) are in place alongside RBAC.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires sending specially crafted HTTP requests with duplicate headers. No authentication needed if RBAC is the only protection.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: 1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, or 1.34.13

Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-ghc4-35x6-crw5

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Identify Envoy version currently running. 2. Upgrade to patched version (1.37.1, 1.36.5, 1.35.8, or 1.34.13). 3. Restart Envoy service. 4. Verify the fix by testing RBAC functionality.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

WAF Header Normalization

all

Configure upstream WAF or load balancer to normalize duplicate headers before they reach Envoy

Additional Validation Layer

all

Implement additional request validation in application layer or using Lua/WASM filters

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement network-level access controls to restrict traffic to Envoy instances
  • Add additional authentication/authorization layers before protected resources

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check Envoy version and RBAC configuration. If using RBAC with header matching and version is below patched versions, system is vulnerable.

Check Version:

envoy --version

Verify Fix Applied:

Test RBAC functionality with duplicate headers after patching. Attempt to bypass deny rules using duplicate headers - should be blocked.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple HTTP requests with duplicate headers to RBAC-protected endpoints
  • Successful access to resources that should be denied by RBAC rules

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP requests containing duplicate headers with same name
  • Unusual traffic patterns to protected endpoints

SIEM Query:

http.headers:* AND (http.request_count > threshold) AND (http.path IN protected_endpoints)

🔗 References

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