CVE-2026-1727

N/A Unknown

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows attackers to access sensitive information by predicting Google Cloud Storage bucket names used by the Agentspace service for error logs and temporary data staging. Attackers can perform 'bucket squatting' by creating these predictable buckets before legitimate use. Only users of Agentspace service versions after December 12th, 2025 are affected.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Agentspace service
Versions: All versions after December 12th, 2025
Operating Systems: Any OS running Agentspace service
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Only affects configurations using Google Cloud Storage for error logs and data staging from GCS/Cloud SQL imports.

⚠️ Manual Verification Required

This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.

Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).

🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.

Recommended Actions:
  1. Review the CVE details at NVD
  2. Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
  3. Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
  4. Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete exposure of sensitive error logs and imported data including potentially confidential information, credentials, or proprietary data.

🟠

Likely Case

Unauthorized access to error logs containing system information, partial data exposure from staging operations.

🟢

If Mitigated

No data exposure if buckets are properly secured with access controls and monitoring.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - Cloud storage buckets are internet-accessible by design, making predictable names particularly dangerous.
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Even internal-only buckets with predictable names could be targeted by internal threats or compromised accounts.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Bucket squatting requires predicting naming patterns and creating buckets before legitimate use. No authentication bypass needed.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Latest version as of advisory date

Vendor Advisory: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini/enterprise/docs/release-notes#February_06_2026

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

1. Update to latest Agentspace service version. 2. No user action required according to vendor.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Manual bucket naming override

all

Configure Agentspace to use random or custom bucket names instead of predictable patterns

# Configuration depends on specific Agentspace implementation

Bucket access restrictions

all

Apply strict IAM policies and bucket permissions to prevent unauthorized access

gsutil iam ch -d allUsers gs://BUCKET_NAME
gsutil iam ch -d allAuthenticatedUsers gs://BUCKET_NAME

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict bucket naming policies with randomness
  • Enable bucket versioning and logging to detect squatting attempts
  • Regularly audit GCS bucket permissions and ownership

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check if using Agentspace service version after Dec 12, 2025 and if using predictable GCS bucket naming patterns

Check Version:

# Check Agentspace service version through service-specific commands

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify updated to latest version and confirm bucket names are no longer predictable

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unexpected bucket creation events
  • Access logs showing data retrieval from unfamiliar buckets
  • Failed data import operations due to bucket conflicts

Network Indicators:

  • DNS queries for predictable bucket names
  • HTTP requests to suspected squatting buckets

SIEM Query:

source="gcp_audit" (resource.type="gcs_bucket" AND protoPayload.methodName="storage.buckets.create") | where protoPayload.request.bucket.name matches "predictable-pattern*"

🔗 References

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