CVE-2025-6386

7.5 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This timing attack vulnerability in the parisneo/lollms authentication system allows attackers to enumerate valid usernames and guess passwords by analyzing response time differences. Attackers can incrementally discover passwords by observing how response times vary based on the number of matching initial characters. All users running affected versions of lollms are vulnerable to credential compromise.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • parisneo/lollms
Versions: All versions before 20.1
Operating Systems: All platforms running Python
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Any deployment using the default authentication mechanism is vulnerable. The vulnerability exists in the core authentication function regardless of configuration.

⚠️ Manual Verification Required

This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.

Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).

🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.

Recommended Actions:
  1. Review the CVE details at NVD
  2. Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
  3. Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
  4. Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete compromise of all user accounts, leading to unauthorized access, data theft, and potential privilege escalation within the lollms system.

🟠

Likely Case

Targeted credential harvesting of specific user accounts, particularly administrators or high-value targets, resulting in unauthorized access to sensitive functionality.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact with proper network controls and monitoring, though authentication bypass remains possible for determined attackers.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

The exploit requires no authentication and uses simple timing analysis. Public proof-of-concept exists in the huntr.com bounty report.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: 20.1

Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/parisneo/lollms/commit/f78437f7b5aa39a78c6201912faf4e0645a38c48

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Update lollms to version 20.1 or later using pip: 'pip install --upgrade lollms==20.1' 2. Restart the lollms service or application 3. Verify the update completed successfully

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Implement rate limiting

all

Add strict rate limiting to authentication endpoints to make timing attacks impractical

# Configure web server or application rate limiting
# Example for nginx: limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=auth:10m rate=5r/m;
# Then apply to auth endpoints: limit_req zone=auth burst=10 nodelay;

Add random delay to authentication

all

Introduce random delays in authentication responses to obscure timing differences

# In lollms_authentication.py, modify authenticate_user function
import time
import random
# Add: time.sleep(random.uniform(0.1, 0.3)) before returning

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement network-level controls: Place lollms behind a WAF with rate limiting and timing attack protection
  • Enable multi-factor authentication: Add additional authentication factors to compensate for password vulnerability

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check if lollms version is below 20.1 and examine lollms_authentication.py for use of '==' operator in password comparison

Check Version:

python -c "import lollms; print(lollms.__version__)"

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify lollms version is 20.1 or higher and check that password comparison uses constant-time comparison (e.g., hmac.compare_digest)

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple failed authentication attempts from single IP with varying usernames
  • Unusual pattern of authentication attempts with incremental password changes

Network Indicators:

  • High volume of authentication requests to /auth endpoints
  • Requests with systematically varying password parameters

SIEM Query:

source="lollms" AND (event_type="authentication_failure" AND count > 10) BY src_ip WITHIN 5m

🔗 References

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