CVE-2025-53104
📋 TL;DR
A command injection vulnerability in gluestack-ui's GitHub Actions workflow allowed attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Actions runner by crafting malicious GitHub Discussion titles or bodies. This affected anyone using the vulnerable discussion-to-slack.yml workflow in gluestack-ui repositories. The vulnerability has been fixed by removing the vulnerable workflow.
💻 Affected Systems
- gluestack-ui
⚠️ Manual Verification Required
This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.
Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).
🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.
- Review the CVE details at NVD
- Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
- Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
- Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete compromise of the GitHub Actions runner environment, allowing attackers to steal secrets, modify source code, deploy malicious artifacts, or pivot to internal systems.
Likely Case
Unauthorized access to repository secrets, source code exfiltration, or malicious code injection into the CI/CD pipeline.
If Mitigated
No impact if the vulnerable workflow is removed or not in use.
🎯 Exploit Status
Exploitation requires ability to create or modify GitHub Discussions in the affected repository. The vulnerability is straightforward to exploit once an attacker has discussion access.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Commit e6b4271 and later
Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/gluestack/gluestack-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-432r-9455-7f9x
Restart Required: No
Instructions:
1. Update to gluestack-ui commit e6b4271 or later. 2. If using a fork or derivative, manually remove the .github/workflows/discussion-to-slack.yml file. 3. Ensure no other workflows contain similar command injection patterns.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Remove vulnerable workflow file
allManually delete the discussion-to-slack.yml workflow file from your repository
rm .github/workflows/discussion-to-slack.yml
Disable GitHub Discussions
allTemporarily disable GitHub Discussions feature in repository settings
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Restrict GitHub Discussions permissions to trusted users only
- Implement repository secret scanning and monitor for unauthorized access
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Check if .github/workflows/discussion-to-slack.yml exists in your repositoryCheck Version:
git log --oneline | grep -i e6b4271Verify Fix Applied:
Verify the workflow file is removed and no similar command injection patterns exist in other workflows📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Unusual shell commands in GitHub Actions logs
- Unexpected network connections from Actions runners
- Unauthorized access to repository secrets
Network Indicators:
- Outbound connections from GitHub Actions runners to unexpected destinations
- Data exfiltration patterns from CI/CD environment
SIEM Query:
source="github-actions" AND (command="$(curl" OR command="$(wget" OR command="$(nc" OR command="$(bash")