CVE-2025-44619

9.1 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

The Tinxy WiFi Lock Controller v1 RF transmits on an open Wi-Fi network without authentication, allowing attackers to join the network and potentially control the lock. This affects all users of the vulnerable Tinxy WiFi Lock Controller v1 RF device. Attackers within Wi-Fi range can exploit this vulnerability.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Tinxy WiFi Lock Controller v1 RF
Versions: All versions with the vulnerable configuration
Operating Systems: Embedded firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: The vulnerability exists in the default Wi-Fi configuration that transmits without authentication. All devices with factory settings are vulnerable.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Attackers gain full control of the lock, allowing unauthorized physical access to secured premises, disable security features, or manipulate lock states remotely.

🟠

Likely Case

Attackers join the open network, intercept communications, potentially manipulate lock commands, or conduct denial-of-service attacks against the lock.

🟢

If Mitigated

With proper network segmentation and access controls, impact is limited to network reconnaissance and potential disruption of lock functionality.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - The open Wi-Fi network is directly accessible to anyone within range, making it trivial for attackers to join without authentication.
🏢 Internal Only: LOW - This is primarily an external-facing vulnerability due to the open Wi-Fi network configuration.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires only joining the open Wi-Fi network, which can be done with standard Wi-Fi scanning tools. No authentication or special tools needed.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: http://tinxy.com

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

1. Contact Tinxy support for firmware updates or configuration guidance. 2. Check vendor website for security advisories. 3. Consider replacing with a secure model if no fix is available.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Configure Wi-Fi Security

all

Enable WPA2/WPA3 encryption on the lock controller's Wi-Fi network

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate the lock controller on a separate VLAN with strict access controls

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Physically disconnect the device from Wi-Fi and use alternative control methods if available
  • Implement physical security measures to compensate for the vulnerable electronic lock

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Scan for open Wi-Fi networks in the vicinity of the lock controller. If a network named similar to 'Tinxy-Lock' or similar is open (no password required), the device is vulnerable.

Check Version:

Check device label or mobile app for firmware version. No standard command available for embedded devices.

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify the lock's Wi-Fi network now requires authentication (WPA2/WPA3 password) to join. Attempt to connect without credentials should fail.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unauthorized MAC addresses connecting to the lock's Wi-Fi network
  • Multiple failed authentication attempts if security is enabled

Network Indicators:

  • Open Wi-Fi network broadcasts from lock controller
  • Unusual network traffic patterns from lock device

SIEM Query:

Search for: 'open wifi network detected' OR 'unauthorized device connected to IoT network'

🔗 References

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