CVE-2025-41012
📋 TL;DR
This vulnerability in TCMAN GIM v11 allows unauthenticated attackers to determine whether specific user accounts exist on the system by exploiting a SOAP web service endpoint. Attackers can use this information to facilitate further attacks like credential stuffing or targeted phishing. Organizations using TCMAN GIM v11 version 20250304 are affected.
💻 Affected Systems
- TCMAN GIM
📦 What is this software?
Gim by Tcman
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Attackers could enumerate all valid usernames, then use this information for targeted credential attacks, potentially leading to full system compromise through password spraying or social engineering.
Likely Case
Attackers will identify valid user accounts and use this information for targeted phishing campaigns or credential stuffing attacks against those specific accounts.
If Mitigated
With proper network segmentation and authentication controls, impact is limited to user enumeration without direct access to sensitive data or systems.
🎯 Exploit Status
The vulnerability requires sending specially crafted SOAP requests to the web service endpoint, which is straightforward for attackers with basic web testing tools.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Not available
Vendor Advisory: https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-tcman-gim-2
Restart Required: No
Instructions:
1. Monitor vendor website for security updates. 2. Apply patch when available. 3. Test in non-production environment first. 4. Deploy to production systems.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Block Web Service Endpoint
windowsRestrict access to the vulnerable PDAWebService.asmx endpoint using firewall rules or web server configuration.
# Example firewall rule for Windows: netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block TCMAN GIM WebService" dir=in action=block protocol=TCP localport=80,443 remoteip=any program="C:\Path\To\TCMAN\Service.exe"
Implement Web Application Firewall
allDeploy WAF rules to block requests containing 'soapaction UnlockUser' with 'pda:userId' and 'pda:newPassword' parameters.
# Example ModSecurity rule: SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains PDAWebService.asmx" "chain,id:1001,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'TCMAN GIM CVE-2025-41012 Exploit Attempt'"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:SOAPAction "@contains UnlockUser" "chain"
SecRule ARGS:pda:userId "!^$" "chain"
SecRule ARGS:pda:newPassword "!^$"
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Implement network segmentation to isolate TCMAN GIM systems from untrusted networks
- Enable multi-factor authentication for all user accounts to mitigate credential attacks
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Send a SOAP request to /WS/PDAWebService.asmx with SOAPAction: UnlockUser and parameters pda:userId and pda:newPassword. If the response differs for existing vs non-existing users, the system is vulnerable.Check Version:
Check the TCMAN GIM administration interface or configuration files for version information. The vulnerable version is specifically 20250304 of v11.Verify Fix Applied:
Attempt the same SOAP request after applying mitigations. The endpoint should either be inaccessible or return consistent responses regardless of user existence.📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Multiple SOAP requests to PDAWebService.asmx with UnlockUser action
- Failed authentication attempts following user enumeration patterns
- Web server logs showing 200 OK responses to UnlockUser requests with different user IDs
Network Indicators:
- Unusual SOAP traffic to /WS/PDAWebService.asmx from external IPs
- Multiple requests with different pda:userId parameters
- Traffic patterns suggesting automated user enumeration
SIEM Query:
source="web_server" AND uri="/WS/PDAWebService.asmx" AND (soapaction="UnlockUser" OR parameters CONTAINS "pda:userId") | stats count by src_ip, user_agent