CVE-2025-2843
📋 TL;DR
This vulnerability allows Kubernetes users with only namespace-level permissions to create a MonitorStack resource, which triggers the Observability Operator to create a ServiceAccount with ClusterRole. The attacker can then impersonate this ServiceAccount to gain cluster-wide privileges, leading to privilege escalation. This affects Kubernetes clusters running vulnerable versions of the Observability Operator.
💻 Affected Systems
- Red Hat OpenShift Observability Operator
⚠️ Manual Verification Required
This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.
Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).
🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.
- Review the CVE details at NVD
- Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
- Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
- Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete cluster compromise - attacker gains full administrative control over the entire Kubernetes cluster, allowing deployment of malicious workloads, data exfiltration, or destruction of resources.
Likely Case
Privilege escalation from namespace-level tenant to cluster administrator, enabling lateral movement, resource manipulation, and potential data breaches.
If Mitigated
Limited impact if proper RBAC controls, network policies, and monitoring are in place to detect unusual ServiceAccount creation and impersonation attempts.
🎯 Exploit Status
Exploitation requires authenticated access to Kubernetes API with namespace-level permissions. The attack chain is straightforward once the MonitorStack creation permission is obtained.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: 1.0.0-1
Vendor Advisory: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:21146
Restart Required: Yes
Instructions:
1. Update Observability Operator to version 1.0.0-1 or later. 2. For OpenShift: Update via OperatorHub or CLI. 3. Verify the new version is running and the vulnerable ServiceAccount creation behavior is fixed.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Restrict MonitorStack Creation
allRemove or restrict RBAC permissions for users to create MonitorStack resources in vulnerable namespaces.
kubectl delete clusterrolebinding <binding-name>
kubectl delete rolebinding <binding-name>
Monitor ServiceAccount Creation
allImplement monitoring and alerting for unexpected ServiceAccount creation by the Observability Operator.
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Implement strict RBAC controls to limit who can create MonitorStack resources
- Enable Kubernetes audit logging and monitor for ServiceAccount impersonation attempts
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Check Observability Operator version: kubectl get deployment observability-operator -n openshift-observability-operator -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}'Check Version:
kubectl get deployment observability-operator -n openshift-observability-operator -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}' | grep -o ':[0-9.]*'Verify Fix Applied:
Verify version is 1.0.0-1 or later and test that creating MonitorStack no longer grants cluster-level ServiceAccount permissions.📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Unexpected ServiceAccount creation by observability-operator
- ClusterRoleBinding creation for observability-operator ServiceAccounts
- Impersonation requests for observability-operator ServiceAccounts
Network Indicators:
- Unusual API calls from namespace-limited accounts attempting cluster-wide operations
SIEM Query:
kubernetes.audit AND verb:impersonate AND impersonatedUser.name:*observability*