CVE-2025-22896
📋 TL;DR
mySCADA myPRO Manager stores credentials in cleartext, allowing attackers to read sensitive authentication data. This affects all systems running vulnerable versions of mySCADA myPRO Manager software. Attackers with access to the system could compromise SCADA/ICS environments.
💻 Affected Systems
- mySCADA myPRO Manager
📦 What is this software?
Mypro by Myscada
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Full compromise of SCADA/ICS systems leading to operational disruption, safety incidents, or industrial espionage through credential theft and subsequent unauthorized access.
Likely Case
Credential harvesting leading to unauthorized access to SCADA systems, potentially allowing configuration changes, data exfiltration, or limited operational impact.
If Mitigated
Isolated credential exposure with no lateral movement due to network segmentation and strong access controls limiting the blast radius.
🎯 Exploit Status
Requires local or remote access to read credential storage files. No authentication bypass needed if files are accessible.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Check vendor advisory for specific version
Vendor Advisory: https://www.myscada.org/contacts/
Restart Required: No
Instructions:
1. Contact mySCADA vendor for patched version. 2. Download and install updated myPRO Manager. 3. Verify credential storage is now encrypted.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Restrict File Access
WindowsApply strict file system permissions to prevent unauthorized reading of credential storage files
icacls "C:\Program Files\mySCADA\myPRO Manager\*" /deny Everyone:(R)
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Implement network segmentation to isolate myPRO Manager from untrusted networks
- Deploy application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized processes from accessing credential files
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Check if credential files in myPRO Manager installation directory contain plaintext passwords or are unencryptedCheck Version:
Check application version in Help > About or program propertiesVerify Fix Applied:
Verify credential files are encrypted or hashed after patch installation📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Multiple failed authentication attempts followed by successful login from new location
- Unusual file access patterns to credential storage files
Network Indicators:
- Unexpected connections to SCADA systems from new IP addresses
- Anomalous protocol traffic patterns
SIEM Query:
source="myPRO Manager" AND (event_type="file_access" AND file_path="*credential*") OR (auth_success="true" AND src_ip NOT IN allowed_ips)