CVE-2025-1616

4.7 MEDIUM

📋 TL;DR

This critical vulnerability in FiberHome AN5506-01A ONU GPON RP2511 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands through command injection in the Diagnosis component's Destination Address parameter. The vulnerability affects GPON optical network units used by internet service providers and their customers. Attackers can exploit this without authentication to gain control of affected devices.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • FiberHome AN5506-01A ONU GPON RP2511
Versions: Unknown specific versions, but all versions with vulnerable Diagnosis component
Operating Systems: Embedded firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects GPON optical network units deployed by ISPs. The Diagnosis component appears to be enabled by default.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete device compromise allowing attackers to install persistent backdoors, intercept network traffic, pivot to internal networks, or use the device as part of a botnet.

🟠

Likely Case

Remote code execution leading to device takeover, network disruption, credential theft, and potential lateral movement within service provider networks.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if devices are behind firewalls with strict inbound filtering and network segmentation prevents lateral movement.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploit has been publicly disclosed and requires minimal technical skill to execute. Remote exploitation without authentication makes this highly dangerous.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: None available

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

No official patch available. Contact FiberHome support for firmware updates. Monitor vendor website for security advisories.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Disable Diagnosis Service

all

Disable or restrict access to the Diagnosis component if possible through device configuration

Check device web interface or CLI for Diagnosis service settings

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate ONU devices in separate network segments with strict firewall rules

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict network access controls to block all inbound traffic to ONU management interfaces
  • Deploy network intrusion detection systems to monitor for exploitation attempts and command injection patterns

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check if device responds to exploitation attempts targeting the Diagnosis component's Destination Address parameter. Test with controlled payloads in lab environment only.

Check Version:

Check device web interface or use SNMP queries to determine firmware version

Verify Fix Applied:

Test if command injection is still possible after applying any workarounds or firmware updates. Verify that OS commands cannot be executed through the Destination Address parameter.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unusual command execution in system logs
  • Multiple failed authentication attempts to Diagnosis service
  • Suspicious network connections from ONU devices

Network Indicators:

  • Unusual outbound connections from ONU devices
  • Traffic patterns indicating command and control communication
  • Exploitation attempts targeting port 80/443 with command injection payloads

SIEM Query:

source="ONU_Logs" AND ("Diagnosis" OR "Destination Address") AND ("cmd" OR "bash" OR "sh" OR "powershell")

🔗 References

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