CVE-2024-7156

5.3 MEDIUM

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in TOTOLINK A3700R routers allows remote attackers to access sensitive configuration information through the ExportSettings.sh CGI script. It affects users of TOTOLINK A3700R firmware version 9.1.2u.5822_B20200513. The information disclosure could expose network configurations and credentials.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • TOTOLINK A3700R
Versions: 9.1.2u.5822_B20200513
Operating Systems: Embedded Linux (router firmware)
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects the apmib Configuration Handler component via /cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh endpoint.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Attackers obtain router configuration including admin credentials, Wi-Fi passwords, and network topology, enabling full network compromise.

🟠

Likely Case

Attackers access router configuration files containing sensitive network information and potentially administrative credentials.

🟢

If Mitigated

Information disclosure limited to non-sensitive configuration data if proper access controls and network segmentation are implemented.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - The vulnerability is remotely exploitable and public exploit exists for internet-facing devices.
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Internal attackers could exploit this to gain network configuration information for lateral movement.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploit code is publicly available on GitHub. The vendor did not respond to disclosure attempts.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: None available

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

No official patch available. Consider upgrading to newer firmware versions if available from vendor.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Disable CGI Script Access

linux

Block access to the vulnerable /cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh endpoint

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m string --string "/cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh" --algo bm -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m string --string "/cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh" --algo bm -j DROP

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate router management interface from untrusted networks

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict firewall rules to block external access to router management interface
  • Change all default credentials and monitor for unauthorized configuration exports

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Test if http://[router-ip]/cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh returns configuration data without authentication

Check Version:

Check router web interface or use: curl -s http://[router-ip]/ | grep -i firmware

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify the endpoint no longer returns configuration data or returns access denied

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • HTTP requests to /cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh
  • Large configuration file downloads from router

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP GET requests to ExportSettings.sh endpoint
  • Unusual traffic patterns to router management interface

SIEM Query:

source="router_logs" AND uri="/cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh"

🔗 References

📤 Share & Export