CVE-2024-50692

5.4 MEDIUM

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in SunGrow WiNet-S inverters allows attackers to send arbitrary commands to inverters using hardcoded MQTT credentials and intercept communications due to missing TLS authentication. It affects all SunGrow WiNet-SV200.001.00.P027 and earlier versions, potentially impacting industrial energy systems.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • SunGrow WiNet-SV200
Versions: SV200.001.00.P027 and all earlier versions
Operating Systems: Embedded firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: All deployments with default MQTT configuration are vulnerable. Requires network access to MQTT broker (default port 1883).

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Attackers could manipulate inverter operations, cause equipment damage, disrupt power generation, or create safety hazards in industrial environments.

🟠

Likely Case

Unauthorized monitoring of energy data, manipulation of inverter settings, or disruption of normal operations through command injection.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited to network reconnaissance or unsuccessful exploitation attempts if proper network segmentation and monitoring are in place.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires network access to MQTT broker. Tools like mqtt-pwn can be used for exploitation. No authentication needed due to hardcoded credentials.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Versions after SV200.001.00.P027

Vendor Advisory: https://en.sungrowpower.com/security-notice-detail-2/5961

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Contact SunGrow support for firmware update. 2. Download latest firmware version. 3. Apply firmware update through management interface. 4. Restart inverter system. 5. Verify MQTT configuration uses TLS and unique credentials.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate inverter network from untrusted networks using firewalls

MQTT Broker Hardening

linux

Configure MQTT broker to require TLS and unique credentials

mosquitto_passwd -c /etc/mosquitto/passwd inverter_user
echo 'listener 8883' >> /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf
echo 'require_certificate true' >> /etc/mosquitto/mosquitto.conf

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict network segmentation - isolate inverter systems in separate VLAN with firewall rules blocking external MQTT access
  • Deploy network monitoring and IDS/IPS to detect MQTT protocol anomalies and unauthorized access attempts

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check firmware version in management interface. If version is SV200.001.00.P027 or earlier, system is vulnerable. Also test MQTT connection without TLS using default credentials.

Check Version:

Check inverter management interface or use manufacturer's diagnostic tools

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify firmware version is newer than SV200.001.00.P027. Test that MQTT connections require TLS and reject connections with default credentials.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • MQTT connection attempts without TLS
  • Authentication failures with default credentials
  • Unusual command patterns to inverter topics

Network Indicators:

  • MQTT traffic on port 1883 (non-TLS)
  • MQTT PUBLISH commands to inverter control topics from unauthorized sources
  • Man-in-the-middle attacks on MQTT communications

SIEM Query:

source="mqtt.log" AND (event="connection" AND NOT tls="true") OR (event="auth" AND user="default_user")

🔗 References

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