CVE-2024-4254
📋 TL;DR
This CVE describes a GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability in the gradio repository that allows attackers to exfiltration sensitive secrets. The workflow improperly executes code from forks with elevated permissions, exposing secrets like GITHUB_TOKEN and AWS credentials. Anyone using the vulnerable gradio repository workflow is affected.
💻 Affected Systems
- gradio-app/gradio
📦 What is this software?
Gradio by Gradio Project
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete compromise of all exposed secrets including AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, and Vercel tokens, leading to unauthorized access to cloud infrastructure, code repositories, and deployment systems.
Likely Case
Exfiltration of GitHub tokens allowing unauthorized code pushes, repository access, and potential supply chain attacks through malicious commits.
If Mitigated
Limited impact with proper secret management and workflow restrictions, potentially only exposing non-critical tokens.
🎯 Exploit Status
Exploitation requires creating a malicious fork and triggering the workflow, which is straightforward for attackers familiar with GitHub Actions
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Check latest main branch commits after 72f4ca88ab569aae47941b3fb0609e57f2e13a27
Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/security/advisories
Restart Required: No
Instructions:
1. Update to latest gradio repository version
2. Replace vulnerable deploy-website.yml workflow
3. Review and rotate all exposed secrets
4. Audit workflow permissions
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Disable vulnerable workflow
allTemporarily disable the deploy-website.yml workflow to prevent exploitation
# In GitHub repository settings:
# Settings > Actions > General > Workflow permissions
# Set to 'Read repository contents permission' or disable workflow
Restrict workflow triggers
allModify workflow to only run on trusted branches and require manual approval
# Edit .github/workflows/deploy-website.yml
# Add:
on:
pull_request:
branches:
- main
types: [closed]
# And require manual review for forks
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Immediately rotate all exposed secrets (GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS keys, Vercel tokens, etc.)
- Implement strict branch protection rules and require code reviews for all workflow changes
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Check if your .github/workflows/deploy-website.yml contains unsafe checkout from forks or runs untrusted code with elevated permissionsCheck Version:
git log --oneline -n 1 .github/workflows/deploy-website.ymlVerify Fix Applied:
Verify workflow uses 'actions/checkout@v4' with 'ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}' and has proper permission restrictions📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Unexpected workflow runs from forks
- Unauthorized secret usage in GitHub Actions logs
- Suspicious push events to protected branches
Network Indicators:
- Unexpected API calls to AWS, Vercel, or Hugging Face from GitHub Actions IP ranges
SIEM Query:
source="github-actions" AND (event.action="workflow_run" OR event.action="repository_dispatch") AND workflow.name="deploy-website" AND actor NOT IN ["trusted-users-list"]