CVE-2024-40090

4.3 MEDIUM

📋 TL;DR

The Vilo 5 Mesh WiFi System running firmware version 5.16.1.33 or earlier contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its Boa webserver. Remote, unauthenticated attackers can leak memory addresses from uClibc and the stack by sending a simple GET request to the index page. This affects all users of vulnerable Vilo 5 Mesh WiFi Systems.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Vilo 5 Mesh WiFi System
Versions: <= 5.16.1.33
Operating Systems: Embedded Linux with uClibc
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects the Boa webserver component running on the device. All default configurations are vulnerable.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Memory address leaks could enable attackers to bypass ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization), facilitating more sophisticated attacks like remote code execution if combined with other vulnerabilities.

🟠

Likely Case

Attackers gain information about system memory layout, which could assist in developing further exploits but doesn't directly compromise system integrity or confidentiality.

🟢

If Mitigated

With proper network segmentation and firewall rules, the impact is limited to information gathering that doesn't lead to immediate system compromise.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires only a simple HTTP GET request to the device's web interface. The GitHub reference contains technical details.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: > 5.16.1.33

Vendor Advisory: http://vilo.com

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Log into Vilo admin interface. 2. Navigate to firmware update section. 3. Check for and install any available updates. 4. Reboot the device after update completes.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate Vilo devices from untrusted networks using firewall rules

Access Control

linux

Restrict web interface access to trusted IP addresses only

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s TRUSTED_IP -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Segment Vilo devices on isolated VLANs away from critical infrastructure
  • Implement strict firewall rules blocking external access to Vilo web interface ports (typically 80/443)

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Send GET request to device IP address and check response for memory address patterns in headers or body

Check Version:

Check Vilo admin interface under System Information or Settings

Verify Fix Applied:

After update, verify firmware version > 5.16.1.33 and test that GET requests no longer leak memory addresses

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple GET requests to root path from unusual sources
  • Webserver error logs showing memory-related anomalies

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP GET requests to device IP on port 80/443 from external addresses
  • Unusual traffic patterns to mesh system web interface

SIEM Query:

sourceIP="Vilo_Device_IP" AND destPort=80 AND httpMethod=GET AND userAgent!="Browser_User_Agent"

🔗 References

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