CVE-2024-29146
📋 TL;DR
This vulnerability in Sharp and Toshiba multifunction printers exposes decrypted user passwords in memory before login, allowing attackers to retrieve them from coredump files. It affects organizations using vulnerable printer models, potentially compromising user credentials. The issue stems from improper handling of sensitive information in memory.
💻 Affected Systems
- Sharp MX/MX-B/MX-M series multifunction printers
- Toshiba e-STUDIO multifunction printers
⚠️ Manual Verification Required
This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.
Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).
🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.
- Review the CVE details at NVD
- Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
- Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
- Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Attackers gain administrative access to printer systems, extract all user credentials, pivot to internal networks, and compromise additional systems using stolen passwords.
Likely Case
Local attackers or malicious insiders extract passwords from memory dumps, gaining unauthorized access to printer management interfaces and potentially other systems if password reuse occurs.
If Mitigated
With proper network segmentation and access controls, impact is limited to printer management functions without lateral movement to other systems.
🎯 Exploit Status
Exploitation requires local access to trigger coredump or memory analysis. Technical details and proof-of-concept are publicly available in security advisories.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Varies by model - check vendor-specific firmware updates
Vendor Advisory: https://global.sharp/products/copier/info/info_security_2024-05.html
Restart Required: Yes
Instructions:
1. Identify affected printer models from vendor advisories. 2. Download latest firmware from vendor support sites. 3. Apply firmware update following vendor instructions. 4. Restart printers to activate fixes. 5. Verify firmware version after update.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Disable coredump generation
allPrevent creation of memory dump files that could contain decrypted passwords
Vendor-specific - consult printer administration interface
Restrict physical and network access
allLimit who can access printer management interfaces and physical devices
Configure network ACLs
Enable authentication for all printer services
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Segment printer network from critical systems using VLANs or firewalls
- Implement strict access controls and monitor for unauthorized access attempts
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Check printer firmware version against vendor advisories. Review if coredump files contain password strings.
Check Version:
Check via printer web interface: System Settings > Device Information > Firmware Version
Verify Fix Applied:
Confirm firmware version is updated to patched version listed in vendor advisories. Test that coredump no longer contains decrypted passwords.
📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Unauthorized access to printer management interface
- Multiple failed login attempts
- Coredump file creation events
Network Indicators:
- Unusual network traffic to/from printers
- Port scanning targeting printer management ports
SIEM Query:
source="printer_logs" AND (event_type="authentication_failure" OR event_type="coredump_generated")
🔗 References
- https://global.sharp/products/copier/info/info_security_2024-05.html
- https://jp.sharp/business/print/information/info_security_2024-05.html
- https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU93051062/
- https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2024-06-27-sharp-mfp-17-vulnerabilities.html
- https://www.toshibatec.co.jp/information/20240531_02.html
- https://www.toshibatec.com/information/20240531_02.html
- http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jul/0