CVE-2024-2178
📋 TL;DR
This path traversal vulnerability in parisneo/lollms-webui allows attackers to read arbitrary files by manipulating parameters in the 'copy_to_custom_personas' endpoint. Attackers can use '../' sequences to access sensitive files outside intended directories. Anyone using vulnerable versions of lollms-webui is affected.
💻 Affected Systems
- parisneo/lollms-webui
📦 What is this software?
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete system compromise through reading sensitive configuration files, credentials, or SSH keys leading to lateral movement.
Likely Case
Unauthorized access to sensitive application files, configuration data, or user information stored on the server.
If Mitigated
Limited to reading files accessible by the web application user account, potentially exposing application secrets.
🎯 Exploit Status
Simple path traversal attack requiring only HTTP requests with manipulated parameters.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Unknown specific version - check latest releases
Vendor Advisory: https://huntr.com/bounties/e585f1dd-a026-4419-8f42-5835e85fad9e
Restart Required: Yes
Instructions:
1. Update to latest lollms-webui version. 2. Verify the fix in lollms_personalities_infos.py. 3. Restart the webui service.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Input Validation Filter
allAdd input validation to reject parameters containing path traversal sequences
# In lollms_personalities_infos.py, add validation before processing category/name parameters
# Example: if '..' in category or '..' in name: return error
Endpoint Restriction
allRestrict access to the vulnerable endpoint using web server rules
# For nginx: location ~* /copy_to_custom_personas { deny all; }
# For Apache: <Location "/copy_to_custom_personas"> Require all denied </Location>
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Implement strict input validation at the web application level to filter '../' sequences
- Use file system permissions to restrict the web application user's access to sensitive directories
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Test by sending HTTP request to /copy_to_custom_personas with category=../../etc&name=passwd and check if sensitive file contents are returnedCheck Version:
Check lollms-webui version in web interface or package metadataVerify Fix Applied:
Attempt the same path traversal attack after patching - should receive error response instead of file contents📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- HTTP requests to /copy_to_custom_personas with '..' in parameters
- Unusual file access patterns from web application process
Network Indicators:
- HTTP requests containing path traversal sequences in URL parameters
SIEM Query:
web.url:*copy_to_custom_personas* AND (web.query:*..* OR web.param:*..*)