CVE-2024-0077

7.8 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in NVIDIA's Virtual GPU Manager allows guest operating systems to allocate unauthorized resources, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or denial of service. It affects systems using NVIDIA vGPU technology with vulnerable versions of the vGPU plugin.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • NVIDIA Virtual GPU Manager
  • NVIDIA vGPU software
Versions: All versions prior to the fixed release
Operating Systems: Linux (host systems running NVIDIA vGPU)
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects systems using NVIDIA vGPU technology for GPU virtualization. Requires NVIDIA vGPU license and compatible hardware.

⚠️ Manual Verification Required

This CVE does not have specific version information in our database, so automatic vulnerability detection cannot determine if your system is affected.

Why? The CVE database entry doesn't specify which versions are vulnerable (no version ranges provided by the vendor/NVD).

🔒 Custom verification scripts are available for registered users. Sign up free to download automated test scripts.

Recommended Actions:
  1. Review the CVE details at NVD
  2. Check vendor security advisories for your specific version
  3. Test if the vulnerability is exploitable in your environment
  4. Consider updating to the latest version as a precaution

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete compromise of the hypervisor host through guest-to-host escape, allowing attacker control over all virtual machines and underlying infrastructure.

🟠

Likely Case

Guest-to-guest attacks where one compromised VM can affect other VMs on the same host, leading to data theft or service disruption.

🟢

If Mitigated

Isolated impact limited to individual guest VMs if proper segmentation and monitoring are in place.

🌐 Internet-Facing: LOW - This vulnerability requires access to guest VM console or management interfaces, which are typically not internet-facing.
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH - Internal attackers with guest VM access can exploit this to compromise other VMs or the hypervisor host.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: UNKNOWN
Unauthenticated Exploit: ✅ No
Complexity: MEDIUM

Exploitation requires guest VM access and knowledge of vGPU resource allocation mechanisms. No public exploits available at this time.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Check NVIDIA security bulletin for specific fixed versions

Vendor Advisory: https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5520

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Review NVIDIA security bulletin ID 5520. 2. Download appropriate vGPU software update from NVIDIA portal. 3. Apply update to hypervisor host. 4. Restart host system. 5. Update guest VM drivers if required.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Isolate vGPU-enabled VMs

all

Place vGPU-enabled virtual machines on separate hosts from critical infrastructure

Restrict guest VM permissions

all

Limit guest VM access to vGPU management interfaces and resource allocation APIs

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict network segmentation between vGPU-enabled VMs and critical systems
  • Enable enhanced monitoring and logging of vGPU resource allocation requests

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check NVIDIA vGPU software version on hypervisor host and compare against patched versions in security bulletin

Check Version:

nvidia-smi -q | grep 'Driver Version' or check vGPU manager version in /proc/driver/nvidia/version

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify vGPU software version matches or exceeds patched version listed in NVIDIA advisory

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unusual vGPU resource allocation patterns
  • Guest VM attempts to allocate excessive vGPU resources
  • Errors in vGPU manager logs related to authorization failures

Network Indicators:

  • Abnormal traffic between guest VMs sharing same vGPU host
  • Unexpected connections to vGPU management interfaces

SIEM Query:

source="nvidia-vgpu" AND (event_type="resource_allocation" AND status="unauthorized") OR (resource_count > threshold)

🔗 References

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