CVE-2022-31081

7.3 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

CVE-2022-31081 is an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability in HTTP::Daemon Perl library versions before 6.15. It allows attackers to bypass security controls, poison caches, or gain unauthorized API access by sending malformed Content-Length headers. This primarily affects developers using HTTP::Daemon for local development and testing, though production deployments are rare.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • HTTP::Daemon Perl library
Versions: All versions prior to 6.15
Operating Systems: All platforms running Perl
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Primarily affects development/test environments; production use with HTTP::Daemon directly is uncommon.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Privileged API access, cache poisoning leading to credential theft or data manipulation, and potential escalation to backend systems.

🟠

Likely Case

Cache poisoning in development environments, potential API abuse in improperly configured deployments.

🟢

If Mitigated

Minimal impact with proper request validation or when used behind reverse proxies like Nginx/Apache.

🌐 Internet-Facing: LOW - HTTP::Daemon is rarely used in production internet-facing deployments.
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Could affect internal development/test environments and improperly configured internal services.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: UNKNOWN
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: MEDIUM

Exploitation requires crafting malformed HTTP requests with abnormal Content-Length headers.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: 6.15

Vendor Advisory: http://metacpan.org/release/HTTP-Daemon/

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Update HTTP::Daemon via CPAN: 'cpan HTTP::Daemon'
2. Verify version >=6.15
3. Restart any services using HTTP::Daemon

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Request validation workaround

all

Add Content-Length header validation before processing requests

# In Perl code after $conn->get_request():
my $cl = $rqst->header('Content-Length');
if ($cl && $cl !~ /^\d+(?:,\s*\d+)*$/) {
    $conn->send_error(400);
    return;
}

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Deploy HTTP::Daemon behind reverse proxy (Nginx/Apache) with proper request validation
  • Implement network segmentation to isolate HTTP::Daemon instances from sensitive systems

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check Perl module version: 'perl -MHTTP::Daemon -e "print $HTTP::Daemon::VERSION\n"'

Check Version:

perl -MHTTP::Daemon -e "print $HTTP::Daemon::VERSION\n"

Verify Fix Applied:

Confirm version is 6.15 or higher using same command

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • HTTP 400 errors with malformed Content-Length headers
  • Unusual request patterns with multiple Content-Length values

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP requests with non-numeric or multiple Content-Length headers
  • Requests that bypass normal validation

SIEM Query:

http.content_length:*[^0-9,]* OR http.content_length:*,,*

🔗 References

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