CVE-2021-44390

7.7 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

A denial-of-service vulnerability in Reolink RLC-410W cameras allows attackers to cause device reboots via specially crafted HTTP requests to the cgiserver.cgi JSON parser. This affects Reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102 firmware users, potentially disrupting surveillance operations.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Reolink RLC-410W
Versions: v3.0.0.136_20121102
Operating Systems: Embedded Linux firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects the web interface component of the camera firmware. Other Reolink models may be affected but not confirmed.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Persistent denial-of-service attacks could render cameras unavailable for extended periods, creating surveillance blind spots and potentially enabling physical security breaches.

🟠

Likely Case

Temporary camera reboots causing surveillance gaps of 1-2 minutes during reboot cycles, disrupting continuous monitoring.

🟢

If Mitigated

Minimal impact with proper network segmentation and access controls preventing external exploitation.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - Directly exposed cameras can be easily targeted via HTTP requests without authentication.
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Requires internal network access but exploitation is simple once access is obtained.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires sending malformed JSON to the cgiserver.cgi endpoint. No authentication needed. Public technical details available in Talos reports.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: v3.0.0.148_21102911 or later

Vendor Advisory: https://support.reolink.com/hc/en-us/articles/4412337313817

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Log into camera web interface. 2. Navigate to System > Maintenance > Firmware Upgrade. 3. Upload latest firmware from Reolink website. 4. Camera will reboot automatically after upgrade.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate cameras on separate VLAN without internet access

Access Control Lists

linux

Restrict HTTP access to camera management interface

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s trusted_ip -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Segment cameras on isolated network without internet exposure
  • Implement strict firewall rules allowing only trusted IPs to access camera web interface

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check firmware version in camera web interface under System > Device Information. If version is v3.0.0.136_20121102 or earlier, device is vulnerable.

Check Version:

curl -s http://camera_ip/cgi-bin/cgiserver.cgi?cmd=getDevInfo | grep version

Verify Fix Applied:

Confirm firmware version is v3.0.0.148_21102911 or later after upgrade. Test by attempting to send malformed JSON requests to cgiserver.cgi endpoint.

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple reboot events in system logs
  • HTTP requests to /cgi-bin/cgiserver.cgi with malformed JSON

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP POST requests to camera IP on port 80 with JSON payloads
  • Unusual traffic patterns to camera management interface

SIEM Query:

source="camera_logs" AND (event="reboot" OR uri="/cgi-bin/cgiserver.cgi")

🔗 References

📤 Share & Export