CVE-2021-36707

9.8 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on ProLink PRC2402M routers by injecting malicious commands into the led_cmd parameter. Attackers can gain full system control without authentication. All users running affected firmware versions are vulnerable.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • ProLink PRC2402M router
Versions: V1.0.18 and older
Operating Systems: Embedded Linux
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: The vulnerable adm.cgi binary is accessible via web interface with page=ledonoff parameter.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete system compromise allowing attackers to install persistent backdoors, pivot to internal networks, steal credentials, or use the device for botnet activities.

🟠

Likely Case

Remote code execution leading to device takeover, network reconnaissance, and potential lateral movement within the network.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if device is behind strict firewall rules with no external access, though internal threats remain.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - The vulnerability is remotely exploitable without authentication, making internet-facing devices immediate targets.
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH - Even internally, the vulnerability requires no authentication and provides full system access.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Simple command injection with publicly available proof-of-concept. No authentication required.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: Not available

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

No official patch available. Check vendor website for firmware updates beyond V1.0.18.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Network Isolation

linux

Place affected routers behind strict firewall rules to block external access to web interface

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP

Access Restriction

linux

Restrict web interface access to trusted IP addresses only

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Replace affected devices with supported models from vendors with active security updates
  • Implement network segmentation to isolate vulnerable routers from critical systems

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Access http://[router-ip]/adm.cgi?page=ledonoff&led_cmd=;id and check if command output appears

Check Version:

Check web interface login page or system information page for firmware version

Verify Fix Applied:

Test the same payload after applying workarounds - should receive error or no command execution

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unusual POST requests to /adm.cgi with page=ledonoff
  • Commands containing semicolons or pipes in led_cmd parameter
  • Multiple failed login attempts followed by ledonoff access

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP requests with suspicious parameters like ;id, ;ls, or ;cat
  • Outbound connections from router to unknown IPs

SIEM Query:

source="router_logs" AND uri="/adm.cgi" AND (query="*page=ledonoff*" OR query="*led_cmd=*;*")

🔗 References

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