CVE-2021-22779

9.1 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized read/write access to industrial controllers by spoofing Modbus communications between engineering software and controllers. It affects Schneider Electric's EcoStruxure Control Expert, Process Expert, SCADAPack RemoteConnect, and Modicon PLCs. This could lead to manipulation of industrial control systems.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • EcoStruxure Control Expert
  • EcoStruxure Process Expert
  • EcoStruxure Hybrid DCS
  • SCADAPack RemoteConnect for x70
  • Modicon M580 CPU
  • Modicon M340 CPU
Versions: All versions prior to EcoStruxure Control Expert V15.0 SP1, including all versions of Unity Pro; all versions of other affected products
Operating Systems: Windows (for engineering software)
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects both engineering station software and PLC controllers; vulnerability exists in Modbus communication protocol implementation.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete compromise of industrial control systems allowing attackers to manipulate physical processes, cause equipment damage, disrupt operations, or create safety hazards in critical infrastructure.

🟠

Likely Case

Unauthorized access to controller logic and data, enabling reconnaissance, data theft, or manipulation of industrial processes without physical access.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact with proper network segmentation, monitoring, and authentication controls that detect and block unauthorized Modbus communications.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH if controllers are directly exposed to internet, as exploit requires only network access to Modbus ports.
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH as internal attackers or compromised internal systems can exploit this without authentication to gain controller access.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires network access to Modbus ports (typically TCP 502) and ability to spoof communications; no authentication required.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: EcoStruxure Control Expert V15.0 SP1 or later

Vendor Advisory: http://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2021-194-01

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Download and install EcoStruxure Control Expert V15.0 SP1 or later from Schneider Electric. 2. Update all affected PLC firmware to latest versions. 3. Restart engineering stations and controllers after updates.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate control network from corporate/IT networks using firewalls

Modbus Port Restriction

all

Block unauthorized access to Modbus TCP port 502 using firewall rules

# Windows firewall: netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block Modbus" dir=in action=block protocol=TCP localport=502
# Linux iptables: iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 502 -j DROP

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict network segmentation to isolate control systems from untrusted networks
  • Deploy intrusion detection systems monitoring for unauthorized Modbus communications and spoofing attempts

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check if using affected software versions and if Modbus ports are accessible from untrusted networks

Check Version:

# For EcoStruxure Control Expert: Check Help > About in application

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify installation of EcoStruxure Control Expert V15.0 SP1 or later and updated PLC firmware

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unauthorized connection attempts to Modbus ports
  • Unexpected engineering software connections
  • Multiple failed authentication attempts followed by successful access

Network Indicators:

  • Spoofed Modbus packets from unexpected IP addresses
  • Modbus traffic from non-engineering stations
  • Abnormal Modbus function codes or addressing

SIEM Query:

source="firewall" dest_port=502 AND (src_ip NOT IN [authorized_engineering_ips])

🔗 References

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