CVE-2021-1230

8.6 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in ACI mode allows unauthenticated remote attackers to crash the BGP routing process by sending crafted BGP updates, potentially causing device reloads and denial of service. It affects both IBGP and EBGP implementations. Only devices configured with explicit BGP peers are vulnerable.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches
Versions: ACI mode software releases prior to 14.2(1)
Operating Systems: Cisco NX-OS in ACI mode
Default Config Vulnerable: ✅ No
Notes: Only vulnerable when BGP is configured with explicit peers; default configurations without BGP are not affected

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete network outage due to device reloads, disrupting all traffic through affected switches

🟠

Likely Case

Temporary routing instability and packet loss until BGP process restarts or device recovers

🟢

If Mitigated

No impact if proper BGP peer filtering and network segmentation are implemented

🌐 Internet-Facing: MEDIUM - Requires established TCP connection from trusted peer, but internet-facing BGP peers could be targeted
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH - Internal attackers with network access to BGP peers could easily exploit this

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: MEDIUM

Exploitation requires sending specific BGP update messages over established TCP connections from trusted peers, making it moderately complex but feasible for skilled attackers

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Cisco NX-OS in ACI mode Release 14.2(1) and later

Vendor Advisory: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-n9kaci-bgp-De9dPKSK

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Download the fixed software from Cisco Software Center. 2. Upgrade to Release 14.2(1) or later. 3. Reload the device to apply the update.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

BGP Peer Filtering

all

Implement strict BGP peer filtering using access control lists to limit which IP addresses can establish BGP sessions

router bgp <AS_NUMBER>
neighbor <IP_ADDRESS> remote-as <AS_NUMBER>
neighbor <IP_ADDRESS> password <PASSWORD>
neighbor <IP_ADDRESS> prefix-list FILTER-IN in

TCP MD5 Authentication

all

Enable TCP MD5 authentication for all BGP sessions to prevent unauthorized connections

router bgp <AS_NUMBER>
neighbor <IP_ADDRESS> password <MD5_KEY>

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict network segmentation to isolate BGP traffic and limit exposure
  • Deploy intrusion prevention systems to detect and block malicious BGP update patterns

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check current software version with 'show version' and verify if running ACI mode software prior to 14.2(1)

Check Version:

show version | include nxos.aci

Verify Fix Applied:

After upgrade, verify version is 14.2(1) or later with 'show version' and test BGP stability

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • BGP process crash logs
  • Device reload events
  • Unexpected BGP neighbor state changes

Network Indicators:

  • Unusual BGP update patterns
  • Rapid BGP session flaps
  • Increased TCP resets on BGP port 179

SIEM Query:

source="cisco_nexus" AND ("BGP.*crash" OR "reload" OR "%BGP-5-ADJCHANGE")

🔗 References

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