CVE-2020-25614

9.8 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in xmlquery library versions before 1.3.1 allows attackers to cause denial of service (SIGSEGV crash) by feeding non-XML content to the LoadURL function. Any application using xmlquery to parse XML from untrusted URLs is affected, potentially leading to service disruption.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • xmlquery library
  • Applications using xmlquery Go library
Versions: All versions before 1.3.1
Operating Systems: All platforms where Go applications run
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Only affects applications using LoadURL function with untrusted URLs. Applications using xmlquery only with trusted/local XML files are not vulnerable.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Remote code execution or complete service crash affecting availability, though RCE is unspecified in the CVE description.

🟠

Likely Case

Denial of service through application crash when processing maliciously crafted responses.

🟢

If Mitigated

No impact if proper input validation is implemented or if xmlquery is not used with untrusted URLs.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Proof of concept available in GitHub issues. Exploitation requires ability to control URL input to LoadURL function.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: 1.3.1

Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/antchfx/xmlquery/compare/v1.3.0...v1.3.1

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Update Go module dependency to xmlquery v1.3.1 or later. 2. Run 'go get github.com/antchfx/xmlquery@v1.3.1'. 3. Rebuild and redeploy affected applications.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Input validation wrapper

all

Implement wrapper function that validates response content type before passing to xmlquery

// Go code: validate Content-Type header contains 'application/xml' or 'text/xml' before calling LoadURL

Restrict URL sources

all

Only allow xmlquery.LoadURL to be called with trusted, whitelisted URLs

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement network segmentation to restrict xmlquery usage to trusted internal sources only
  • Deploy WAF rules to block malicious content types or patterns in responses

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check go.mod or go.sum for xmlquery dependency version below 1.3.1

Check Version:

grep xmlquery go.mod || grep xmlquery go.sum

Verify Fix Applied:

Confirm xmlquery version is 1.3.1 or higher in go.mod and verify application doesn't crash with test non-XML responses

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • SIGSEGV crashes in application logs
  • Panic stack traces mentioning xmlquery.InnerText

Network Indicators:

  • Unusual outbound HTTP requests to external URLs from application
  • Responses with non-XML content types to xmlquery calls

SIEM Query:

process.name: "your_app" AND log.message: "panic" AND log.message: "xmlquery"

🔗 References

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