CVE-2020-14062

8.1 HIGH

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in FasterXML jackson-databind allows remote code execution through deserialization of untrusted data. Attackers can exploit the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing features to execute arbitrary code when processing malicious JSON payloads. Affected systems include any application using vulnerable versions of jackson-databind with polymorphic type handling enabled.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • FasterXML jackson-databind
  • Applications using jackson-databind for JSON processing
Versions: 2.x before 2.9.10.5
Operating Systems: All
Default Config Vulnerable: ✅ No
Notes: Requires polymorphic type handling (default typing or @JsonTypeInfo) to be enabled. Default configurations without these features are not vulnerable.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Remote code execution leading to complete system compromise, data theft, and lateral movement within the network.

🟠

Likely Case

Remote code execution with the privileges of the application processing JSON data, potentially leading to application takeover.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if proper input validation and deserialization controls are in place, potentially resulting in denial of service.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: MEDIUM

Exploitation requires sending malicious JSON payloads to endpoints that deserialize with polymorphic type handling enabled.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: 2.9.10.5 or later

Vendor Advisory: https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/2704

Restart Required: Yes

Instructions:

1. Update jackson-databind dependency to version 2.9.10.5 or later. 2. Update Maven/Gradle dependencies accordingly. 3. Restart affected applications. 4. Verify no older vulnerable versions remain in the dependency tree.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Disable polymorphic type handling

all

Disable default typing and avoid @JsonTypeInfo annotations in vulnerable configurations

Configure ObjectMapper with disableDefaultTyping()

Block JNDI connections

all

Configure JVM to disable JNDI lookups from untrusted sources

-Dcom.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase=false
-Dcom.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase=false

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all JSON inputs
  • Use allow-listing for deserialization classes instead of block-listing

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check pom.xml or build.gradle for jackson-databind version <2.9.10.5, or run: mvn dependency:tree | grep jackson-databind

Check Version:

mvn dependency:tree | grep jackson-databind OR gradle dependencies | grep jackson-databind

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify jackson-databind version is 2.9.10.5 or higher in dependency tree

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unusual JNDI connection attempts
  • Exceptions related to com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool
  • Stack traces containing deserialization errors

Network Indicators:

  • Unusual outbound LDAP/RMI connections from application servers
  • Large or malformed JSON payloads to API endpoints

SIEM Query:

source="application.logs" AND ("JNDIConnectionPool" OR "xalan2" OR "jackson.databind")

🔗 References

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