CVE-2020-10270
📋 TL;DR
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to access the control dashboard of MiR robots via hardcoded IP addresses and default credentials. Attackers can take full control of the robots, enabling unauthorized movement, payload manipulation, and disabling safety features. All MiR100, MiR200, MiR250, MiR500, and MiR1000 robots with default configurations are affected.
💻 Affected Systems
- MiR100
- MiR200
- MiR250
- MiR500
- MiR1000
📦 What is this software?
Er Flex Firmware by Enabled Robotics
Er Lite Firmware by Enabled Robotics
Er One Firmware by Enabled Robotics
Er200 Firmware by Mobile Industrial Robotics
Mir100 Firmware by Aliasrobotics
Mir1000 Firmware by Aliasrobotics
Mir200 Firmware by Aliasrobotics
Mir250 Firmware by Aliasrobotics
Mir500 Firmware by Aliasrobotics
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete remote takeover of robot fleet leading to physical damage, theft of payloads, collisions with personnel or equipment, and disruption of operations.
Likely Case
Unauthorized access to robot controls allowing movement manipulation, disabling safety features, and potential data exfiltration from connected systems.
If Mitigated
Limited to network reconnaissance if proper segmentation and authentication controls are implemented.
🎯 Exploit Status
Exploitation requires network access but uses publicly documented default credentials, making it accessible to entry-level attackers.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Not available
Vendor Advisory: Not provided in CVE details
Restart Required: No
Instructions:
No official patch available. Follow workarounds and mitigation steps below.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Change Default Credentials
allImmediately change all default passwords for wireless interfaces and control dashboard access.
Access robot web interface via hardcoded IP, navigate to administration settings, change credentials
Network Segmentation
allIsolate robot control networks from general corporate networks and internet access.
Configure firewall rules to restrict access to robot IP addresses
Implement VLAN segmentation for robot networks
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Disable wireless interfaces if not required for operations
- Implement strict network access controls allowing only authorized management stations
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Attempt to access robot control dashboard via documented hardcoded IP addresses using default credentials from user manuals.Check Version:
Check robot firmware version via web interface or serial console connection.Verify Fix Applied:
Verify new credentials are required for access and default credentials no longer work. Confirm network segmentation prevents unauthorized access.📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Failed authentication attempts followed by successful login with default credentials
- Unauthorized access to control dashboard endpoints
Network Indicators:
- Traffic to hardcoded robot IP addresses from unauthorized sources
- Control protocol traffic from unexpected network segments
SIEM Query:
source_ip=* AND destination_ip=[robot_hardcoded_IP] AND (event_type=auth_success OR event_type=access_granted)