CVE-2019-13394

9.8 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability affects Voo-branded NETGEAR CG3700b routers running custom firmware V2.02.03, which use HTTP Basic Authentication over unencrypted HTTP connections. Attackers on the same network can intercept authentication credentials transmitted in cleartext, allowing unauthorized access to the router's administrative interface. This affects all users of these specific router models with the vulnerable firmware.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Voo-branded NETGEAR CG3700b router
Versions: Custom firmware V2.02.03
Operating Systems: Embedded router firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Only affects Voo-branded versions with their custom firmware; standard NETGEAR firmware may not be affected.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Attackers intercept administrative credentials, gain full control of the router, modify network settings, redirect traffic, install malware, or use the device as a pivot point into the internal network.

🟠

Likely Case

Local network attackers capture router admin credentials, change DNS settings to redirect users to malicious sites, or modify firewall rules to expose internal services.

🟢

If Mitigated

With proper network segmentation and monitoring, impact is limited to the compromised router itself, though attackers could still intercept credentials and access the admin interface.

🌐 Internet-Facing: LOW
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ✅ No
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires being on the same network segment; tools like Wireshark or ettercap can capture credentials from HTTP traffic.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: No official vendor advisory found

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

No official patch available; contact Voo or NETGEAR for firmware updates or replacement options.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Force HTTPS Access

all

Configure router to only allow HTTPS access to the admin interface if supported

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate router management interface on separate VLAN

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Replace affected routers with models that support HTTPS for management
  • Implement strict network access controls to limit who can reach the router's management interface

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Access router admin interface via HTTP (not HTTPS) and check if authentication is transmitted in cleartext using network monitoring tools

Check Version:

Login to router admin interface and check firmware version in system settings

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify all management traffic uses HTTPS and no HTTP Basic Authentication is transmitted in cleartext

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Multiple failed login attempts
  • Successful logins from unexpected IP addresses
  • Configuration changes from unauthorized users

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP traffic to router management port containing 'Authorization: Basic' headers
  • Unencrypted authentication traffic to router IP

SIEM Query:

source_ip="router_ip" AND http.method="POST" AND http.uri="/login" AND NOT tls.version EXISTS

🔗 References

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