CVE-2018-18375

9.8 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

This vulnerability in Orange AirBox routers allows attackers to extract sensitive APN configuration data including names, numbers, usernames, and passwords via an unauthenticated web request. Attackers can exploit this to steal credentials and potentially compromise mobile network access. Users of Orange AirBox Y858_FL_01.16_04 routers are affected.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Orange AirBox Y858_FL
Versions: 01.16_04
Operating Systems: Embedded router OS
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Affects the specific firmware version mentioned; other versions may also be vulnerable but unconfirmed.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Attackers steal APN credentials, gain unauthorized access to mobile networks, intercept communications, and potentially pivot to other network resources.

🟠

Likely Case

Attackers extract APN credentials and use them for unauthorized mobile data access or credential reuse attacks against other systems.

🟢

If Mitigated

With proper network segmentation and access controls, impact is limited to credential exposure without lateral movement opportunities.

🌐 Internet-Facing: HIGH - The vulnerable endpoint is accessible via web interface, making internet-exposed devices immediately vulnerable.
🏢 Internal Only: MEDIUM - Internal attackers or compromised internal systems can exploit this to steal credentials and potentially pivot externally.

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ⚠️ Yes
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Simple HTTP GET request to /goform/getProfileList with rand parameter triggers the leak. Public proof-of-concept code exists on GitHub.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Unknown

Vendor Advisory: Unknown

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

No official patch available. Check Orange vendor website for firmware updates or contact Orange support for patching guidance.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Block Web Interface Access

linux

Restrict access to the router's web management interface using firewall rules

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP

Disable Remote Management

all

Turn off remote management/administration features in router settings

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Segment affected routers on isolated network segments to limit lateral movement
  • Monitor for unusual outbound connections or credential usage from affected devices

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Send HTTP GET request to http://[router-ip]/goform/getProfileList?rand=test and check if APN data is returned in response

Check Version:

Check router web interface or use nmap -sV [router-ip] to identify firmware version

Verify Fix Applied:

After applying workarounds, verify the endpoint no longer returns APN data or is inaccessible

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • HTTP requests to /goform/getProfileList with rand parameter
  • Unusual access to router management interface

Network Indicators:

  • HTTP GET requests to router IP on port 80/443 with specific parameter patterns
  • Outbound connections using extracted APN credentials

SIEM Query:

source="router_logs" AND uri="/goform/getProfileList" AND query_string="*rand=*"

🔗 References

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