CVE-2017-9861

9.8 CRITICAL

📋 TL;DR

SMA Solar Technology products have a SIP implementation vulnerability that lacks proper authentication and encryption, making them susceptible to replay attacks, packet injection, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Attackers within the LAN can crash devices, disrupt communications, exploit SIP vulnerabilities, or extract sensitive information like passwords. Only Sunny Boy TLST-21/TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10/TL-30 models are potentially affected.

💻 Affected Systems

Products:
  • Sunny Boy TLST-21
  • Sunny Boy TL-21
  • Sunny Tripower TL-10
  • Sunny Tripower TL-30
Versions: All versions with vulnerable SIP implementation
Operating Systems: Embedded firmware
Default Config Vulnerable: ⚠️ Yes
Notes: Vendor states authentication with encryption is not required on isolated subnetworks. Only affects specific models mentioned.

📦 What is this software?

⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact

🔴

Worst Case

Complete device compromise allowing attackers to crash devices, extract passwords, disrupt solar monitoring/control, and potentially exploit other SIP vulnerabilities for further system access.

🟠

Likely Case

Unauthorized access to device communications, password extraction, and potential service disruption through packet injection attacks.

🟢

If Mitigated

Limited impact if devices are properly isolated on secure subnets with strict network segmentation and monitoring.

🌐 Internet-Facing: LOW
🏢 Internal Only: HIGH

🎯 Exploit Status

Public PoC: ✅ No
Weaponized: LIKELY
Unauthenticated Exploit: ⚠️ Yes
Complexity: LOW

Exploitation requires LAN access but no authentication. Attackers can eavesdrop, inject packets, or replay communications.

🛠️ Fix & Mitigation

✅ Official Fix

Patch Version: Not specified

Vendor Advisory: http://www.sma.de/en/statement-on-cyber-security.html

Restart Required: No

Instructions:

No official patch available. Follow vendor security guidance and implement network isolation controls.

🔧 Temporary Workarounds

Network Segmentation

all

Isolate affected devices on dedicated, firewalled subnetworks with no internet access

Access Control Lists

all

Implement strict ACLs to limit SIP communication to authorized management systems only

🧯 If You Can't Patch

  • Implement strict network segmentation to isolate affected devices from untrusted networks
  • Monitor network traffic for unusual SIP communications and implement intrusion detection

🔍 How to Verify

Check if Vulnerable:

Check device model against affected list and verify SIP communication lacks encryption/authentication

Check Version:

Check device model via SMA monitoring interface or physical device labeling

Verify Fix Applied:

Verify network segmentation is properly implemented and SIP traffic is restricted to authorized systems

📡 Detection & Monitoring

Log Indicators:

  • Unauthorized SIP connection attempts
  • Device communication disruptions
  • Multiple failed authentication attempts

Network Indicators:

  • Unencrypted SIP traffic to/from affected devices
  • SIP traffic from unauthorized IP addresses
  • Unusual packet patterns in SIP communications

SIEM Query:

source_ip IN (affected_device_ips) AND protocol=sip AND (event_type=connection_attempt OR packet_size>threshold)

🔗 References

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