CVE-2017-7575
📋 TL;DR
This vulnerability in Schneider Electric Modicon TM221CE16R PLCs allows remote attackers to retrieve the application-protection password via a crafted Modbus request. With this password, attackers can download, modify, and upload the PLC application program, potentially altering industrial processes. Organizations using affected Schneider Electric PLCs in industrial control systems are at risk.
💻 Affected Systems
- Schneider Electric Modicon TM221CE16R
📦 What is this software?
Modicon Tm221ce16r Firmware by Schneider Electric
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete compromise of industrial processes leading to physical damage, production shutdowns, or safety incidents through unauthorized program modifications.
Likely Case
Unauthorized access to PLC logic, potential program theft or tampering, and disruption of industrial operations.
If Mitigated
Limited impact with proper network segmentation and access controls preventing external access to Modbus port.
🎯 Exploit Status
Simple crafted Modbus request triggers password disclosure. Exploit code is publicly available in security advisories.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Update to firmware version beyond 1.3.3.3 (consult Schneider Electric for specific patched version)
Vendor Advisory: http://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2017-097-02
Restart Required: Yes
Instructions:
1. Download updated firmware from Schneider Electric. 2. Backup current PLC program. 3. Apply firmware update via programming software. 4. Restart PLC. 5. Verify firmware version.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Network Segmentation
allIsolate PLCs from untrusted networks using firewalls to block external access to Modbus port 502/tcp.
Access Control Lists
allImplement network ACLs to restrict Modbus access only to authorized engineering stations and SCADA systems.
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Implement strict network segmentation to isolate PLCs in dedicated control network zones
- Deploy industrial firewalls with deep packet inspection to detect and block malicious Modbus traffic
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Send crafted Modbus request \x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x05\x01\x5a\x00\x03\x00 to port 502/tcp and check if password is returned in response.
Check Version:
Check PLC firmware version via Schneider Electric programming software (SoMachine, EcoStruxure Machine Expert)
Verify Fix Applied:
After patching, attempt the same exploit request; it should no longer return the application-protection password.
📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- Unusual Modbus traffic patterns
- Multiple failed authentication attempts followed by successful access
- PLC program download/uploads outside maintenance windows
Network Indicators:
- Modbus requests containing \x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x05\x01\x5a\x00\x03\x00 pattern
- Unexpected connections to port 502/tcp from unauthorized sources
SIEM Query:
source_port=502 AND (payload_contains="\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x05\x01\x5a\x00\x03\x00" OR dest_ip=[PLC_IP])
🔗 References
- http://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2017-097-02
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97523
- https://os-s.net/advisories/OSS-2017-01.pdf
- http://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2017-097-02
- http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97523
- https://os-s.net/advisories/OSS-2017-01.pdf