CVE-2013-1391
📋 TL;DR
This CVE describes an authentication bypass vulnerability in multiple CCTV/DVR systems that allows remote attackers to retrieve device configuration without valid credentials. Attackers can access sensitive configuration data including passwords, network settings, and system information. Affected systems include Hunt CCTV, Capture CCTV, Hachi CCTV, NoVus CCTV, and Well-Vision Inc DVR devices.
💻 Affected Systems
- Hunt CCTV
- Capture CCTV
- Hachi CCTV
- NoVus CCTV
- Well-Vision Inc DVR systems
📦 What is this software?
Cdr 0410ve Firmware by Capturecctv
⚠️ Risk & Real-World Impact
Worst Case
Complete system compromise allowing attackers to reconfigure devices, disable security features, access live video feeds, or use devices as pivot points into internal networks.
Likely Case
Configuration theft leading to credential harvesting, network reconnaissance, and potential unauthorized access to video surveillance systems.
If Mitigated
Limited exposure of configuration data without ability to modify settings or access video streams.
🎯 Exploit Status
Metasploit module available (auxiliary/scanner/misc/dvr_config_disclosure). Simple HTTP request to specific endpoint bypasses authentication.
🛠️ Fix & Mitigation
✅ Official Fix
Patch Version: Unknown
Vendor Advisory: No vendor advisory found
Restart Required: No
Instructions:
No official patch available. Consider replacing affected devices with supported models from reputable vendors.
🔧 Temporary Workarounds
Network Segmentation
allIsolate DVR systems from internet and restrict access to authorized networks only
Access Control Lists
linuxImplement firewall rules to restrict access to DVR web interfaces
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s trusted_network -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
🧯 If You Can't Patch
- Disable remote web interface access and require VPN for management
- Change all default credentials and implement strong password policies
🔍 How to Verify
Check if Vulnerable:
Use Metasploit module: use auxiliary/scanner/misc/dvr_config_disclosure, set RHOSTS, run. Or manually test HTTP GET to /device.rsp?opt=user&cmd=listCheck Version:
Check device web interface or physical labels for firmware version informationVerify Fix Applied:
Test the exploit against the device - if configuration data is no longer accessible without authentication, the workaround is effective📡 Detection & Monitoring
Log Indicators:
- HTTP requests to /device.rsp with opt=user&cmd=list parameters
- Unauthenticated access to configuration endpoints
- Multiple failed login attempts followed by configuration access
Network Indicators:
- HTTP GET requests to DVR web interface from unexpected sources
- Traffic to known vulnerable DVR ports (80, 8080, etc.) from scanning IPs
SIEM Query:
source="dvr_web_logs" AND (uri="/device.rsp" AND query="opt=user&cmd=list") AND NOT (user_agent="browser_user_agent")🔗 References
- http://www.securitybydefault.com/2013/01/12000-grabadores-de-video-expuestos-en.html
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/misc/dvr_config_disclosure
- https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/57579/info
- http://www.securitybydefault.com/2013/01/12000-grabadores-de-video-expuestos-en.html
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/misc/dvr_config_disclosure
- https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/57579/info
